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Victims' Rights: Rethinking Our "Adversary System"
William T. Pizzi*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, describing a certain
philosophical problem, wrote that "[a] picture held us captive. And we could
not get outside it, for it lay in our language."' I want to borrow his metaphor,
specifically his claim that a picture holds us captive and we have difficulty
getting outside it, because I see running through American legal scholarship
and judicial opinions a picture of our trial system that holds us captive. It is
the picture of a trial as a two-sided contest between the state and the
individual.
The Victims' Rights Amendment is important because it challenges our
two-sided trial model and forces us to confront some difficult and painful
realities about our trial system that we have avoided for too long. The
Victims' Rights Amendment carries with it formal acknowledgment that
victims of violent crime have a stake in the trial that is different from that of
the general public or even the prosecutor. One can see this most clearly in the
first part of the amendment, which provides that victims of a crime of
violence have the right "not to be excluded from[] any public proceedings
relating to the crime."' It also is evident in other parts of the amendment, such
as the section giving victims of violent crimes the right to be heard on the
merits of any proposed plea bargain.'
While much that is contained in the Victims' Rights Amendment has
already been enacted through state constitutional amendments as well as state
and federal statutes, recognition of the interests of crime victims in the
Constitution is important because it may encourage us to rethink our trial
system. In this Article, I want to use the Victims' Rights Amendment to raise
questions about our trial system and the system's priorities because
reexamination of our trial system is long overdue. To help provide perspec-
tive on the treatment of victims in our trial system, I will contrast with our
system the treatment of crime victims in other western trial systems.
Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
'LUDWIG WrrTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHCALINVESTIGATIONs 48e (G.E.M. Anscombe trans.,
MacMillan 12th prtg. 1966) (1953).




IX. MULTI-SIDED CRIMINAL TRIALS
The picture of criminal trials as two-sided has a powerful hold on us. As
a way of representing the fact that we have moved away from a system of
private prosecution-like other western countries-to one in which
prosecutorial power is vested in a public official, I see nothing wrong with
thinking of criminal cases as two-sided. Normally, there are two tables in the
front of our criminal courtrooms, one for the prosecution and one for the
defense. Also, we caption our criminal cases, "State v. Jones," or "The
People v. Jones," which seems to suggest a two-sided contest. However,
when this generalization about criminal cases is put forward as if it were the
metaphysical structure of criminal cases in this country, it becomes inaccu-
rate, artificial, and confining. Hence, the importance of the Victims' Rights
Amendment.
A closer examination of the structure reveals no metaphysical constraint
that demonstrates that criminal cases have two, and only two, sides. Take the
courtroom, for example. The courtroom is set up for convenience, and there
is nothing to stop us from changing it to make it work better or to permit
more people to sit in the front of the courtroom. While usually we have two
tables, sometimes we put more in the front of the courtroom, particularly
when there are two or more defendants on trial. More importantly, when there
are two defendants, our system recognizes that the interests of the defendants
will almost always differ. The American Bar Association Standards state that
because "[t]he potential for conflict of interest in representing multiple
defendants is so grave," ordinarily a lawyer should decline to represent more
than one defendant in the same criminal case.4 Because the potential conflict
is so serious, some public defender offices have a policy of never represent-
ing more than a single defendant in multiple defendant cases.5
However, it is somehow easier to see divergent interests on the defense
side of a criminal case than on the prosecution side. Perhaps it is because
those supposedly on the prosecution side are masked with a sweeping label,
"the State," or "the People." But what does it mean to say that "the State" is
opposed to the defendant? The prosecutor is usually not even a state
employee, but is an employee of a much smaller entity, be it a county,
borough, parish, or city. The police who investigate the case may be
employees of the same governmental unit, but quite often they may be
employees of a different geographical unit, or even employees of the federal
4STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4-3.5(c) (1993).
'See Gary Lowenthal, Joint Representation in Criminal Cases: A Critical Appraisal, 64
VA. L. REV. 939, 950 (1978) (discussing how some public defender officers have policy of
never representing more than one single defendant in multiple defendant cases).
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government. The prosecutor does not represent the police and sometimes the
police and the prosecution would handle a criminal matter differently before
trial and even at trial.
One example of differences between police and prosecution occurred
during the murder investigation of JonBenet Ramsey in Boulder, Colorado.
There have been indications throughout the investigation that the police and
the district attorney's office were having trouble cooperating.6 Eventually,
one of the lead detectives resigned from the investigation and submitted an
angry resignation letter alleging that the district attorney's office was
crippling police efforts and compromising the case.7
Importantly, even if the investigators and the prosecutors are employees
of the same governmental unit, is it not clear that the police and the
prosecutor ought to have different responsibilities in a strong criminal justice
system? It is certainly true that in a serious criminal case the police and the
prosecution will want to see the person who committed the criminal act
convicted and sentenced appropriately. That will often be true of the trial
judge as well, and perhaps even of the defense attorney where the crime is
particularly horrendous. Yet, each has a distinct professional role to play in
the system, and they need to perform that role whatever their personal
feelings about the crime and the desirable outcome of the criminal case.
Nonetheless, our system tends to see the police and the prosecutor as
working together "on the same side" against the defendant. But if the police
are part of the prosecution team, who is supposed to seek out evidence at the
crime scene that may be important for the defense? In those cases in which
the perpetrator may not be apprehended for several weeks after the crime, the
police must see themselves as duty-bound to do a complete and thorough
investigation that considers possible exculpatory evidence as well as
incriminating evidence. When a criminal justice system fails to emphasize the
need for thorough and objective investigators, the results of an investigation
can more easily become slanted and biased against the defendant. We should
be shocked that a once-prestigious entity such as the FBI laboratory began to
shade its reports and distort its findings to favor the prosecution.8 However,
it is not surprising that it would occur in a system that often fails to distin-
guish between the police and the prosecution. Instead of driving them closer
6See Hector Gutierrez, Assistant DA apologizes to Boulder cops, ROCKY MTN. NEws,
Feb. 15, 1997, at4A.
7See Hector Gutierrez, Detective blasts DA 's handling of JonBenet Ramsey slaying, PITT.
POST GAZETTE, Aug. 8, 1998, at A4; Thomas Resignation Letter, BOULDER DAILY CAMERA
(Aug. 7, 1998) <http:lwww.insideboulder.comlextralramsey/1998/07thomle.html>.
'See Roberto Suro & Pierre Thomas, Justice Dept. Cites Failures of FBI Lab: Evidence
Was Flawed Iz Several Major Cases, WASH. POST, Apr. 16, 1997, at Al (discussing how FBI
crime laboratory produced flawed reports and inaccurate testimony).
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together, as our system does, and conceptualizing the police and prosecution
as a single entity, the "State," which is trying to convict the defendant, our
system should encourage the police to see themselves as having responsibili-
ties independent of the prosecution.
The relationship between the victim and the prosecutor is similar to that
between the police and the prosecutor. The prosecutor does not represent the
victim and cannot give the victim the same advice that a private attorney
might give. A victim may, for example, want advice from the prosecutor as
to whether to meet with the defense investigator who is trying to interview
trial witnesses. A victim's attorney, who knows what a good defense attorney
can do at trial with even minor inconsistencies in prior statements, would
often advise the victim not to meet with the investigator. However tempting
it may be to a prosecutor to give the same advice, it would be unethical for
a prosecutor to do so. The American Bar Association Standards state that it
"is improper for a prosecutor... to suggest to a witness that the witness not
submit to an interview by opposing counsel."9
While the interests of the victim and the prosecutor will converge in
many cases, there will sometimes be cases in which the interests of the victim
and the prosecutor sharply diverge. This will often reflect the fact that the
victim's focus is on the particular criminal case while a prosecutor often has
to see the same case in broader terms that may be influenced by limited
resources, prosecutorial priorities, and even political considerations. An
obvious example of diverging interests would be a relatively serious case
where the prosecutor believes the chances of conviction are not sufficiently
high to merit prosecution while the victim feels that the crime should be
prosecuted even if conviction is unlikely. No one is right or wrong in this
situation; rather, both the victim and the prosecutor are looking at the case
from different perspectives. A prosecutor, these days, usually has no choice
but to make difficult decisions about how limited prosecutorial resources are
to be invested. At the same time, a victim may not agree with the prosecutor's
priorities or the decision about the way the case involving the victim is to be
handled.
Crime victims have often expressed frustration with our trial system
because they are, to a considerable extent, invisible in the system.'0 They
have a legitimate interest in the way a criminal case is handled, but it has
9STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-3.1(d) (1993)
(stating that "[a] prosecutor should not discourage or obstruct communication between
prospective witnesses and defense counsel").
'0See, e.g., Steve Baker, Justice Not Revenge: A Crime Victim's Perspective on Capital
Punishment, 40 UCLA L. REV. 339, 340 (1992) (stating that "[t]he criminal justice equation
does not include the relatives or friends of victims").
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been a battle to get prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys to respect that
interest. The Victims' Rights Amendment represents formal acknowledgment
that victims have a role in the system that can be different from the prosecu-
tor or the police.
This is not to say that the interests of the victim should be paramount to
those of the prosecutor, but the victim's interest should be understood and
considered before an important decision affecting the victim is reached. One
circumstance ripe for application of this principle is the plea bargain. The
Victims' Rights Amendment gives victims the right "to be heard, if present,
and to submit a statement at all such proceedings to determine . . . an
acceptance of a negotiated plea."'" There will be cases in which the victim is
completely supportive of the proposed plea agreement and may desire to tell
this to the court. Nonetheless, there will be cases in which the victim is
strongly opposed to the plea agreement, perhaps because the victim believes
that the charge to which the defendant wishes to plead guilty or the sentence
to be imposed does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the crime. It is
important that the victim have the right to be heard on the proposed plea
bargain.
Permitting the victim to express opposition to the agreement provides a
check on plea bargains that do not serve the public interest. However, one
would suspect that in the vast majority of cases where the victim is opposed
to the proposed bargain, the prosecutor's view of the public interest ought to
lead to acceptance of the bargain by the court. But even if it is a rare case in
which the victim's opposition to a plea agreement is likely to alter the
proposed plea bargain, it is still very important that the victim be heard. We
have a criminal justice system in which lawyers and judges spend a great deal
of their time talking to each other. Nevertheless, the system does a very poor
job of listening to citizens, and that includes not only victims but defendants
as well. Sometimes it is easier to accept decisions with which one disagrees
if one feels that one's views are heard and considered before the decision is
made. This is what the Victims' Rights Amendment provides for victims.
Hm. VICTIMS IN THE COURTROOM
Defense attorneys understand that constitutional recognition of a status
for victims of serious crimes, independent of the prosecutor, has a tremen-
dous symbolic value, and they do not want to see it accorded victims. Gerald
Lefcourt, a leading criminal defense attorney and then-president of the
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers ("NACDL"), wrote an
"S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999).
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article in The Champion, the magazine of the NACDL, attacking the Victims'
Rights Amendment in extreme terms. 2 One of the first worries that he
expresses is that such an amendment "would give victims equal standing in
what amounts to a place at their own counsel table."' 3
I want to reply to this remark by considering his worry that victims
might be permitted to sit in the front of the courtroom at their own counsel
table. To Lefcourt, this seems so clearly wrong as to need no further
explanation for why it is wrong. I think he is correct that the Victims' Rights
Amendment might encourage more states to rethink where the victim should
be seated at criminal trials, but this is exactly the sort of question about which
we ought to be thinking. While states rarely permit victims to sit in the front
of the courtroom at criminal trials," it is not unusual among western
countries to find victims in the front of the courtroom, even occasionally
participating in the trial. In Belgium,,5 France, 6 and Italy, 7 victims have long
had a right to participate in the criminal trial on a rather equal basis with the
state's attorney and the defense attorney. One of the reasons why victims
often choose to participate at the criminal trial is that the victim may be
awarded civil damages at the criminal trial. It is cheaper for the victim to join
in the criminal case and seek damages, rather than later having to bear the
expense of a separate civil case.
Obviously, this is a different model from the United States where civil
damages would have to be pursued separately from the criminal case.
However, my point is not that these countries are a model for us. Rather, I use
these countries simply to point out that permitting some form of victim
1
2See Gerald B. Lefcourt, Of Danger To All, Of Benefit to None, THE CHAMPION, July




4See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-14-54 (1995) (stating that "[a] victim of a criminal offense
shall not be excluded from court or counsel table during the trial or hearing or any portion
thereof conducted by any court which in any way pertains to such offense"). The Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals upheld this statute in Pierce v. State, 576 So. 2d 236, 251 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1990).
'"See Christine Van Den Wyngaert, Belgium, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 17-18 (Christine Van Den Wyngaert ed., 1993) [hereinafter CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE SYSTEMS].
'6See R.L. Jones, Victims of Crime in France, 158 JUST. PEACE & LOC. GOV'T L. 795-96
(1994).
17See William T. Pizzi & Luca Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure:
The Dificulties of Building an Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE
J. INT'L L. 1, 14 (1992) (stating that in Italy injured persons are entitled to participate as parties
to criminal case from pretrial to appeal).
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participation in a criminal trial may seem radical to American lawyers, but it
is not at all radical among western countries.
Another country with a somewhat different model of victim participation
at trial is Germany."s Damages are not a.possibility at a German criminal trial
so victim participation at trial is not generally permitted, except for a small
category of serious crimes.19 Among the crimes permitting such participation
are murder, kidnaping, and rape.20 Victims rarely wish to participate in the
trial, feeling that they can rely on the state's attorney and the judges to reach
a fair verdict and sentence." However, this reluctance is not the case in
crimes involving sexual assault, where a high percentage of victims wish to
participate in the trial.22 Victims feel they have a stake in the trial and want
to be present and be represented.
That most sexual assault victims would wish to participate at trial
through counsel, while victims of other serious crimes rarely wish to do so,
should not be surprising. For one thing, the victim's character and credibility
are likely to come under a much more severe attack in a sexual assault case.
Often, for example, in acquaintance-rape cases the attack on the victim
includes the allegation that no crime ever took place because the victim
consented to have sex with the defendant. The defense may attack the victim
on almost every aspect of her testimony in an attempt to suggest that she is
lying and trying to convict the defendant for corrupt reasons. Additionally,
it is not unusual in such cases for issues having to do with the prior relation-
ship between the victim and the defendant to be raised, which may mean
delving into very private events separate from the crime in question. When
one considers the nature of the crime and the likelihood that the victim may
be "put on trial," it is easy to see why sexual assault victims in Germany tend
to see the trial as "their trial" and want to participate in the trial through
counsel.
If some continental countries think that it is appropriate for victims of
serious crimes to participate in criminal trials, why is the Victims' Rights
Amendment so controversial? Notice that the Victims' Rights Amendment
is very modest in what it provides victims with regard to the trial. It gives
victims no right of participation at trial, nor even a right to sit in the front of
1 See generally William T. Pizzi & Walter Perron, Crime Victims in German Court-
rooms: A Comparative Perspective on American Problems, 32 STAN. I. INT'L L. 37 passim
(1996) (comparing Germany's treatment of crime victims with that of United States).
'9See id. at 54-55 (stating that participation is allowed only in crimes that have very
personal impact on victim or victim's family).
2 See id. at 55 (citing StPO § 395).
2 See Pizzi & Perron, supra note 18, at 55 n.76 (stating that in 1989, victim participation
was only 19.2% in cases in which victim was eligible to participate).
2-'See id. at 59 (stating that 67% of victims of sexual assault chose to participate in trial).
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the courtroom. In fact, the Amendment does not even give victims "a right to
be present" at the trial. Instead, it provides victims only the right "not to be
excluded from[] any public proceedings relating to the crime."23 Presumably,
this provision would allow the victim of a violent crime, who is a witness, to
resist a motion for sequestration and to remain in the back of the courtroom.
Given the fact that some states already exempt victims from sequestration
orders and permit them to remain in the courtroom at trial,24 what is being
sought with respect to trial for victims in the Victims' Rights Amendment is
very limited. In addition, when one compares being able to remain in the
courtroom with the participatory role that victims have at trial in the
European countries just mentioned, the change proposed becomes even more
modest.
IV. OUR "ADVERSARY SYSTEM"
In the previous Part, I described some European trial systems that give
victims a participatory role in the courtroom in some cases. If those countries
think it appropriate to recognize an active role for victims in some criminal
cases, why is the Victims' Rights Amendment so wrong in thinking that the
interests of victims of violent crime deserve some formal recognition in our
Constitution? One argument that American lawyers are likely to raise is that
European trial systems and the American trial system are fundamentally
different. Under the traditional dichotomy, the United States is supposed to
have "an adversary system" and European countries are supposed to have "an
inquisitorial system."25
I think this distinction has become blurred over time and that all western
trial systems are adversarial to a degree today.26 Obviously, "to a degree"
means that there are considerable differences from system to system, with
some systems not very adversarial and others more adversarial. To try to
make this point, I want to explore briefly what it might mean when American
lawyers say that our trial system is "an adversary system" and that this is
supposed to distinguish our trial system from European trial systems.
23S.J. Res. 3, 106th Cong. § 1 (1999).
24See, e.g., ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 9.3(a) (1998) (providing that victim has right to be at all
proceedings at which defendant has such right); ALA. R. EVID. 615(4) (1996) (providing that
victim should not be excluded from trial when victim is witness); OR. EvID. CODE 615 (1999)
(same).
25Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, I CHAPMAN L. REV.
57, 84-85 (1998) (discussing debate about whether European countries actually have
inquisitorial system).
261 make this point at some length using the countries of the Netherlands, Germany,
Norway. and England in WILLAM T. Pizzi, TRtALS WITHOUT TRUTH 89-116 (1998).
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Recently, Professor Monroe Freedman has written an article in which he
argues that our adversary system is built into our Constitution.27 I think he is
wrong in making that claim but I do not intend to dispute that point here.
What I want to do is use his definition of the adversary system as a basis for
trying to understand what distinguishes it from the supposedly inquisitorial
systems on the continent. He begins his article with the following definition:
"In its simplest terms, an adversary system resolves disputes by presenting
conflicting views of fact and law to an impartial and relatively passive
arbiter, who decides which side wins what."'28 Working with this definition,
which aspects of the definition distinguish American trials from those that
occur on the continent?
A. Hotly Contested Factual and Legal Issues?
Surely, it is not the presentation of conflicting views of fact and law that
distinguishes the American System from the Continental System as there are
often hotly contested factual or legal issues in all trial systems. To follow up
with the acquaintance-rape example from the previous section, such trials will
often be bitterly contested in any country and in any trial system, with the
victim insisting that she did not give consent and the defense insisting that the
victim consented and is not telling the truth. Several years ago, I witnessed
a rape trial in a courtroom in Freiberg, Germany, where the victim, an
admitted drug addict, claimed that she had been raped by the two
defendants.29 They, in turn, insisted that she had agreed to have sex with them
on the promise that they would give her heroin the following day.3" The
defendants and their lawyers launched a major assault on the victim's
credibility and her character.3' They brought in witnesses who testified that
the victim had prostituted herself for heroin on past occasions.32 In each case,
the victim was recalled to the stand to answer the allegations. 33 It was a
bitterly contested trial, yet it took place within a trial system that is suppos-
edly nonadversarial. In short, "hotly contested" does not serve to distinguish
among western trial systems those that are adversary systems from those that
are not.
27See generally Freedman, supra note 25, at 57.
28Id.







B. Impartial and Relatively Passive Judges?
Perhaps the distinction between the adversarial and inquisitorial systems
lies in the fact that the trial takes place before "an impartial and relatively
passive arbiter."34 The first part of this element-that the judge be
"impartial"-draws no meaningful distinction among trial systems, as every
western trial system wants its fact finders, be they professional judges, lay
judges, jurors, or some combination thereof, to be impartial to the important
task before them. Article 14 of the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights, which has been ratified by all western countries, states that
anyone charged with a crime is entitled to a trial before "a competent,
independent and impartial tribunal."35 All western countries hope that their
judges and fact finders are impartial.
The second part of this element-that the arbiter be "relatively
passive"-does draw a distinction among western trial systems, but the
distinction is not as clear as some might think. Certainly judges on the
continent often take the primary responsibility for calling and questioning
witnesses at trial, and they can be very active in controlling the conduct of the
trial to the point that the lawyers play a greatly reduced role at trial.36 But
there are other continental countries where the parties call the witnesses and
do the bulk of the questioning of witnesses. In Norway37 and Italy,3 for
example, the public prosecutor and the defense attorney call their own
witnesses and do the initial questioning, like the American model. In fact,
Italy considers its trial system to be an adversarial trial system3 9 and yet
victims have broad rights of participation at trial, including questioning
witnesses and making legal arguments. Is Italy an adversary system because
the judges are relatively passive compared to judges in other continental
countries?
34Freedman, supra note 25, at 57.
3 lnternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. XIV, § 1, G.A. Res. 2200A,
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).36See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN, COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: GERMANY
3-60 (1977) (describing criminal procedure in Germany).
37 See Johannes Andenaes, Norwegian Criminal Law, Criminology, and Criminal
Procedure, 2 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 431, 464 (Thomas M. Lockney trans., 1993).
3 See Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 17, at 14.
39See Lawrence J. Fassler, Note, The Italian Penal Procedure Code: An Adversarial
System of Criminal Procedure in Continental Europe, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 245, 246
(1991) (describing overhaul of Italy's penal code in favor of principles and processes of Anglo-
American adversarial procedure).
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What makes this notion of a "relatively passive arbiter" somewhat
problematic as a distinguishing feature is the fact that American trial judges
have the power to ask questions.' While in jury trials, American judges tend
to be very passive, at bench trials some judges ask many questions.4 When
you consider that individual judges often vary considerably in their willing-
ness to intervene and ask questions at trial, "relatively passive" seems to
suggest a difference of degree among trial systems, rather than a bright line
that would separate our trial system from those on the continent.
C. Winning?
What really stands out in Freedman's definition of adversary systems is
the last part of Freedman's description. It states that in the United States, the
duty of the impartial arbiter is to decide "which side wins what., 42 End of
definition. American trials are about winning. European trials are not
conceptualized in that way. Trials in Europe are supposed to aim at the truth.
and to that end, judges (and also the state's attorney) have a responsibility to
pursue relevant issues even if not raised by the parties, or to call witnesses if
that becomes necessary.43 In short, European judges feel responsible for the
outcome of the trial and the justice of the result.
I think a trial system defined in Freedman's terms is ultimately sterile.
Any trial system that is to have credibility has to place heavy emphasis on
trial verdicts that are accurate and reliable. But there is no emphasis on truth
or reliability in Freedman's definition and, unfortunately, his definition
accurately reflects a trial culture where winning and losing are central and
heavily emphasized. In an expensive and extremely complicated system, the
winner will often be the side that has greater resources or the side with the
4°See FED. R. EVID. 611 (b) (stating that "the court may interrogate witnesses, whether
called by itself or by a party").
4'Further complicating the American criminal trial system is the fact that we have a
system of military trials where the fact finders are encouraged to ask questions during the trial
and sometimes play an active role at trial. See SCHLEUTER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 630 (1996).
42Freedman, supra note 25, at 57.
43See JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 124-32 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing
criminal procedure in continental system); Miijan Damaka, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction
and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506,
578-86 (1973) (comparing adversarial and nonadversarial procedures and evidentiary rules
designed for pursuit of truth).
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more skillful advocate, not the side with the stronger evidence. What should
be the responsibility of the trial judge in such a situation?'
Surprisingly, there is no guidance for trial judges in such a situation.
Franklin Strier, in his book Reconstructing Justice, points out that the ABA
Code of Judicial Conduct fails to impose any obligation on trial judges to
seek justice." Instead, the only adjudicative constraint on trial judges is to
perform their task impartially.46 Strier warns that impartiality that is thought
to require passivity "can make the judge an unwilling abettor of intolerable
injustice."47
Some strong European trial systems permit victim participation in some
criminal cases, while other strong European trial systems, such as those in the
Netherlands' s or Denmark,49 do not permit victim participation at trial.
However, those countries would not define their trial systems as being aimed
at deciding "who wins what." The case for victim participation at trial is
much stronger in a system like ours that places a low priority on truth and a
high priority on winning. If you are not a winner in such a system, you will
be a loser, and that is exactly the way that victims are often portrayed after
an acquittal. Has anyone ever heard a defense attorney on the courthouse
steps following an acquittal say anything other than that the verdict shows
that the jury believed the defendant and obviously did not believe the
prosecution?
'American trial judges have the power to call their own witnesses at trial. See FED. R.
EVID. 614(a) (stating that "the court may, on its own or at the suggestion of a party, call
witnesses"). However, there is no guidance as to when or why that power should be used, so
it is rarely exercised.
45See FRANKLIN STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTICE 83 (1994).
46See id.
47Id.
48See A.H.J. Swart, The Netherlands, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS, supra note 15,
at 279.291-92 (stating that victim is more or less without rights in Dutch criminal system).
"gSee Vagn Greve, Denmark, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SYSTEMS, supra note 15, at 51,
59-60 (stating that in Denmark victim has no right to be party to proceedings under penal
aspect of case).
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V. A TRIAL SYSTEM UNSURE WHAT IT IS
Of course, judges do care about the justice of the results that take place
in their courtrooms, but they often seem unsure whether this concern should
temper the system's adversarial excesses. A case that illustrates the
difficulties for judges in our trial system is the Louise Woodward case,
50
which received international publicity." As you may recall, Woodward was
the English au pair charged in Massachusetts with first- and second-degree
murder in the death of Matthew Eappen, the infant in her care. While murder
was a possible verdict, the case always seemed more appropriate as a
manslaughter case. Manslaughter seemed to fit better the facts of the case in
which the teenage defendant was supposed to have become frustrated with
the infant in her care and caused his death by shaking him roughly.
However, at the end of the trial, the defense team, led by three expeni-
enced defense attorneys, asked that the lesser included charge of manslaugh-
ter not be given to the jury. 2 This was viewed as an audacious gamble
because the jury would be left with the difficult choice of either returning a
verdict of second-degree murder or a verdict of acquittal.53 Making the stakes
very high for the defendant was the fact that first-degree murder carried with
it a mandatory life sentence, while second-degree carried with it a life
sentence, but permitted parole after a minimum of fifteen years in prison. 4
Manslaughter had no minimum.
If one wants to understand how extremely adversarial our trial system
can be and how invisible victims are at times in the system, there could
hardly be a better example. The trial judge did not see it as his responsibility
to put to the jury the option that seemed most likely to fit the facts. We can
rationalize this decision by saying that the prosecution "blew it" by charging
murder instead of manslaughter, but is it fair to visit this decision on the
victim and the victim's family? As mentioned earlier, victims in our trial
"°See Commonwealth v. Woodward, No. CRIM. 97-0433, 7 Mass. L. Rptr. 449, 1997
WL 694119 passim (Mass. Super. Nov. 10, 1997) (Zobel, A.J.), aff'd, 694 N.E.2d 1277 (Mass.
1998).
5 While lecturing in China in late October of 1997, I was able to follow developments
in the trial on CNN International.
52See William F. Doherty, Woodward team wins bid to limit verdict to murder or
acquittal, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 28, 1997, at Al (discussing defense team's success in not
allowing jury to consider 'compromise verdict' of manslaughter); CourtTV, Daily Updates
from Massachusetts v. Woodward, Highlights from October 27 (visited Mar. 6, 1999),
<http:llwww.courttv.comtrials/woodwardlweek4.html#oct27> (same).
53See Tunku Varadarajan, Au pair risks 'noose or loose' verdict, TiMES (London), Oct.
28, 1997, at 3.
4See Doherty, supra note 52, at Al.
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system feel like they are invisible and this is a good example. The judge went
to great lengths to make sure that Woodward approved of the daring gamble
that was going to take place. He brought in an additional attorney to make
sure that she was fully informed of the risks of the decision not to instruct on
manslaughter." After meeting with the additional attorney, Woodward told
the court that she agreed with the decision only to put murder or an acquittal
to the jury.
What this judge, a judge with an excellent reputation, 6 was saying to the
world watching this trial is that trials in the United States are more about
winning and losing than they are about accurate verdicts. Obviously, if the
defense had won, there would have been high praise for the brilliance of the
defense advocates and their bold strategy. But we all know what happened.
The prosecutor gave a tremendous summation, and the defendant "lost,"
receiving a life sentence, as she knew she would if she were to be convicted.
When a system emphasizes winning and losing so heavily, and openly
permits such an audacious gamble, losing is possible.
It is at this point that our supposedly "adversary system" took a different
turn. A few days later, the same judge entered the courtroom now concerned
about the injustice of the result.5 Where does this judge come from in an
"adversary system" and where was the judge with these concerns at trial?
Having permitted the defense to gamble and having made sure that the
defendant was fully informed of the consequences of the gamble, where in an
adversary system does this judge get the authority to question the second-
degree murder conviction? The judge substituted a manslaughter verdict and
dropped Woodward's sentence from life (meaning a fifteen-year minimum)
to time served, permitting her immediate release.58
55See id.
56See David Nyhan, But can he make the case for attorney general?, BOSTON GLOBE,
Oct. 26, 1997, at E4 (characterizing Zobel as "a savvy trial judge"); Don Aucoin, While
millions watch: Trial of Woodward in infant's death is touchstone for US, British television,
BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 9, 1997, at AI (quoting Rikki Klieman, Boston lawyer who stated that
Judge Zobel "runs a tight ship"). Judge Hiller Zobel, the judge in the Woodward case, is also
an amateur historian. See Hiller B. Zobel, The Jury on Trial, AMERICAN HERITAGE,
July/August 1995, at 42 (discussing history of trial by jury).
57See Tom Mashberg, Judge rules manslaughter in nanny case, BOSTON HERALD, Nov.
10, 1997, at 4 (quoting Judge Zobel that "justice requires lowering the level of guilt from
murder to manslaughter").
58See Au pairfreed after judge reduces verdict, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 10, 1997, at CI (quoting
Judge Zobel, who remarked that he was "morally certain that allowing this defendant on this
evidence to remain convicted on second-degree murder would be a miscarriage of justice").
Massachusetts sentencing guidelines had suggested a prison sentence of from three to five
years. See David Usbome. Ordinary girl who put justice on trial, THE INDEPENDENT (London),
June 17, 1998, at 3.
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The Woodward case reveals a trial system that does not know what its
goal is. I do not dispute the justice of the manslaughter verdict in the
Woodward case or even the sentence that was imposed. However, the way the
system got there raises serious questions about the premises of our trial
system. In a trial system where judges are supposed to be "relatively passive
arbiters," a single judge rejects the verdict of a jury and imposes the verdict
he feels is correct. He then goes on to impose a very lenient sentence, based
on a view of the facts that some jurors plainly did not accept. 59
I think it is time to put aside the convenient labels and cliches that
dominate the descriptions of our trial system-that " we have an adversary
system," that "we don't trust judges," that "we believe in jurors of 'our
peers,"' and jo on-and look at what we really have. When I do this, I see a
trial system that does not know what it wants to happen at trial and does not
know itself very well. It swings from extremely adversarial to extremely
inquisitorial; from vesting incredible power in juries to permitting judges to
undo or effectively overrule jury verdicts with which they disagree; from
incredibly weak judges, at times, to judges vested with tremendous power
over the liberty of citizens at other times. I do not think any of these extremes
is healthy for victims, or for defendants.
VI. VICTIMS IN OTHER COMMON LAW TRIAL SYSTEMS
I want to return to Gerald Lefcourt's worry-that victims might have a
seat at counsel table--to make one more point about trial systems,
specifically about other common law trial systems. I have to confess that I do
not know of any common law country that would permit the victim to sit in
the front of the courtroom at counsel table, which is the worry Lefcourt
expresses. This might seem to support Mr. Lefcourt's assumption that
permitting a victim to sit in the front of the courtroom ought to be unthink-
able.
The problem is that, in the common law countries I have visited, the
defendant also does not sit in the front of the courtroom at counsel table. The
defendant sits in a small box, usually next to a uniformed guard, at the very
59See Joe Ryan & Anne E. Kornblut, Juror 'appalled' at sentence, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
11, 1997, at B I (quoting juror in Woodward trial who called Judge Zobel's decision "a
complete injustice").60See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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back or at one side of the courtroom. 6' Enter any Crown Court in London and
it is easy to tell who is on trial-I mean that on more than one level.
62
Imagine how Mr. Lefcourt would feel if it was proposed that defendants
at serious criminal trials had to sit in a small box at the very back of the
courtroom, far removed from their attorneys and often even farther from the
proceedings than some members of the public. American defense lawyers
sometimes complain about the difficulty of "personalizing" the defendant to
the jury.63 They are quite fortunate compared to defense barristers in England
who must work at considerable distance from the defendant.' The barrister
cannot personalize the defendant to the jury by putting an arm on the shoulder
of or chatting quietly with the defendant.
I am not advocating that we build docks in American courtrooms or that
we only permit lawyers-and not defendants-to sit inside the bar in our
courtrooms. However, the Victims' Rights Amendment has to be understood
against an American background in which defendants have many advantages
that they do not have in other trial systems. Conversely, American victims
have many disadvantages at trial that they do not have in other trial systems.
It is against this background that the limited "right" provided victims at trial
in the Victims' Rights Amendment-a right "not to be excluded" from
proceedings-should be seen as completely appropriate for our trial system.
VII. A FINAL OBSERVATION ON VICTIMS' RIGHTS
"VERSUS" DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS
One of the frequent claims of those opposed to the Victims' Rights
Amendment is the claim that victims' rights undercut defendants' rights.
Consider again Gerald Lefcourt's attack on the Victims' Rights
Amendment.65 He states that "the amendment establishes rights that would,
by definition, overwhelm protections the Constitution affords defendants
including the presumption of innocence., 66 This is complete hyperbole. The
amendment has been carefully crafted so that its provisions do not conflict
with any of the constitutional rights of defendants. Basically, the amendment
61See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, TIGHTENING THE REINS OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 69-70
(1983) (describing and diagraming where defendant sits in English court).
62See William T. Pizzi, Discovering Who We Are: An English Perspective on the Simpson
Trial, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1027, 1028-29 (1996) (comparing English courtroom, where
defendant does not sit in well of courtroom, to United States system where defendant at times
appears to be "host[ing]" trial).
6 3
1d.
'See GRAHAM, supra note 61, at 69.
6-See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
'See Lefcourt. supra note 12, at 5.
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tracks the law that has been put into effect in the majority of states through
state constitutional amendments.
However, the supposed battle between victims' rights and defendants'
rights is largely a chimera, because a trial system that fails to treat victims
well will often end up treating most defendants poorly too. This is the case
in the United States: our system heavily favors rich and sophisticated
defendants, but it is not a good system for the vast majority of defendants,
who are neither rich nor sophisticated. That our system is not a good one for
most defendants may seem puzzling because comparatistg often say that if a
defendant is really guilty, that defendant would prefer to be tried in the
United States.67 They do not mean that as a compliment. What they mean is
that no matter how strong the evidence, if the defendant has a good lawyer,
anything might happen at trial.
However, the dark side of these apparent advantages is that the
American system has evolved very effective means of coercing defendants to
waive their constitutional rights. What the system does is threaten defendants
with very high punishments if they have the temerity to try to exercise their
constitutional rights.6" What we have seen over the last twenty years has been
a tremendous increase in habitual offender statutes, statutes with high
mandatory punishments and very high sentencing ranges, and other
sentencing statutes that put tremendous pressure on defendants to waive their
rights and avoid trial. 69 The result is a system that works to the advantage of
wealthy and sophisticated defendants but is not a good system for the vast
majority of defendants who are neither wealthy nor sophisticated.
A great deal of sentencing power has been shifted from judges to
prosecutors, and they use this power to pressure defendants to plead guilty or
face some very unattractive alternatives.70 In many states, the number of cases
67See MERRYMAN, supra note 43, at 132 (concluding that "criminal proceedings in the
civil law world are more likely to distinguish accurately between the guilty and the innocent").
"See William T. Pizzi, Punishment and Procedure: A Different View of the American
Criminal Justice System, 13 CONST. CoMM. 55, 55-56 (1996) (arguing that United States
provides strong procedural and constitutional protections for defendants, but that if defendants
choose to go to trial they risk harsher sentencing if found guilty).
69The growing harshness of American sentencing laws and the political pressure that have
encouraged this development have been the subject of book-length studies. See, e.g.,
KATHARINE BECKETTi, MAKING CRIME PAY passim (1997) (analyzing sociohistorical context,
public discourse and popular sentiment as influencing crime control and punishment);
MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATrERS passim (1996) (describing refashioning of sentencing
because it has become recurrent subject of ideological conflict and because of shift in
sentencing processes and institutions).
7 A shocking example of prosecutorial sentencing power and the risks to a defendant of
trying to withstand that power is Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). Hayes turned
down a plea bargain offer of a five-year sentence to go to trial. See id. at 358-59. He was
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going to trial is shrinking. The system is completely given over to plea
bargaining. Why would any sane prosecutor want to go to trial if a trial is a
crapshoot? Also, it is pretty tough for a defendant to turn down a one-year
offer if trial may result in a five- or ten-year minimum sentence.
This is not a criticism of plea bargaining per se. Every western system
has some mechanism for the expedited disposition of a large percentage of
its criminal cases, which offers defendants some discount for avoiding trial
or at least avoiding a prolonged trial.7' However, there is good plea bargaining
and bad plea bargaining, and the United States draws no distinction between
the two. Today, one should worry less about false convictions at trial than
about defendants with credible defenses who go to prison because the
pressure on them-often from their own lawyers-to plead guilty is intense.72
VI. CONCLUSION
What the Victims' Rights Amendment does in terms of expanding the
law for victims is minimal. Many of the provisions of the amendment, such
as the right to file a victim impact statement or the right to be informed and
heard on the merits of proposed plea bargain agreements, are already
embodied in the law of many states. In fact, because the amendment is limited
to crimes of violence, the provisions of the amendment are significantly less
extensive than the existing law in many jurisdictions.
However, the symbolism of recognizing victims in our Constitution is
tremendously important and this Article has tried to show why. There is
nothing inconsistent in having a strong and reliable trial system that, at the
same time, acknowledges that victims have an interest in the prosecution of
a criminal case, including the trial.
Victims are very angry at the treatment they receive in our criminal
justice system and I have tried to show that they have a right to be angry.
Unfortunately, anger is not a good basis on which to make important public
policy decisions and it contributes to the increasing harshness we see in our
system. Crime is a serious problem in all western countries and politicians
have to get elected in these countries as well. But we need to ask ourselves
why judges and lawyers in other countries have been more successful in
convicted and received a mandatory life sentence. See id. at 359.
71See Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 17, at 35-37 (describing plea bargaining analogs in
Denmark, Spain, France, and Germany).
72In a recent article, William Stuntz has warned that a highly complicated legal system
like the American system encourages defense lawyers to work hard at procedural issues and
puts pressure on them to avoid factual lines of inquiry that require much more time to develop.
See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 47 (1997).
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fending off calls for the death penalty, for harsh mandatory minimums, tough
habitual offender statutes, and the like. Part of the answer is that the judges
in those systems have greater credibility with the public and, in some of the
countries at least, the trial system commands greater respect and public
confidence. We need the balance that a Victims' Rights Amendment offers
to restore some of the public confidence our system has lost. Victims need it,
but so do defendants.

